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U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  M I C H I G A N  
OURNAL of  LAW REFORM ONLINE 
COMMENT 
EMINENT DOMAIN FOR THE SEIZURE OF UNDERWATER 
MORTGAGES  
Sarah Thompson* 
Like many cities in the United States, Richmond, California 
suffered greatly from the recent mortgage crisis. The foreclosure 
crisis hit Richmond hard in 2009, when more than 2,000 homes in 
Richmond went into foreclosure.1 This figure is especially 
shocking given that there were 18,659 owner-occupied housing 
units in the city at that time.2 In 2012, the city saw an additional 
914 foreclosures and a foreclosure rate of thirty out of 1,000 
homes (well above the national average of thirteen of every 1,000 
homes).3 Today, it is reported that nearly forty-six percent of 
homes in Richmond are “underwater,” meaning that what is owed 
on the mortgage is more than the current value of the property.4 
Seeking to put an end to the foreclosures, the City of Richmond 
announced a plan on July 30, 2013 to use the power of eminent 
domain to buy underwater mortgages from lenders.5 The city 
plans to buy the mortgages for eighty percent of a home’s current 
value, a price they believe is high enough to amount to the just 
compensation that is required by the Fifth Amendment’s 
                                                   
*  J.D. Candidate, December 2014, University of Michigan Law School. 
1. KRIS HARTLEY, RICHMOND EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE, TRANSFORMING 
THE HOUSING CRISIS IN RICHMOND 4 (2009).  
2. City of Richmond, BAY AREA CENSUS, http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/cities/Rich 
mond.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2013).  
3. Robert Rogers, Richmond Mortgage Crisis: By the Numbers, CONTRA COSTA TIMES 
(May 25, 2013, 12:00 PM), http://www.contracostatimes.com/ci_23317434/richmond-
mortgage-crisis-similar-yet-unique-within-nationwide.  
4. E. Scott Reckard, Richmond Plan to Seize Underwater Loans Faces Key 
Challenges, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2013, 3:13 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/money/la-
fi-mo-richmond-eminent-domain-mortgages-20130910,0,2114249.story.  
5. Les Christie, California city’s drastic foreclosure remedy; Seizure, CNN MONEY 
(July 30, 2013, 2:28 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/30/real_estate/richmond-
underwater-homes/.  
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protection against the taking of private property.6 Richmond 
would then convert the acquired mortgages into FHA loans with 
smaller principals that correspond with the current value of the 
home.7 FHA loans are insured against default by the Federal 
Housing Authority (a section of the United States Department of 
Housing Development) and are issued by private, FHA-approved 
lenders. On August 7, 2013, several banks representing the bond 
investors that owned these underwater mortgages filed suit 
against the city, challenging the plan’s constitutionality. Given the 
current state of eminent domain law, which allows for eminent 
domain to be exercised for the public purpose of economic 
development, some argue that Richmond’s plan passes 
constitutional scrutiny.8  However, this use pushes the boundaries 
of legitimate exercise of eminent domain, even under the 
majority opinion in Kelo v. City of New London, Conn, which 
confirmed that economic development is proper grounds for 
states to exercise eminent domain.9  
Upholding the constitutionality of the Richmond plan would 
be inconsistent with the purpose of the doctrine of eminent 
domain, which allows for taking of private land for public use. 
Furthermore, such a move would animate the fears voiced by the 
critics of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New 
London, Conn, including the concern that eminent domain would 
be used to disproportionate advantage certain individuals with 
little justifiable public benefit.10 Finally, Richmond’s particular use 
of eminent domain may lead to lender backlash as lenders may 
increase the rates on mortgages in cities that have used eminent 
domain in order to hedge against the risk of government seizure. 
                                                   
6. Jacob Gershman, Is Mortgage Seizure Plan a Win-Win or Lose-Win?, WSJ L. BLOG 
(Aug. 8, 2013, 10:24 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/08/08/is-mortgage-seizure-plan-a-
win-win-or-lose-win/. 
7. Marc Joffe, Richmond, CA's Eminent Domain Mortgage Scheme Could Set An 
Ugly National Precedent, FORBES (Sept. 5, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/reals   
pin/2013/09/05/richmond-cas-eminent-domain-mortgage-scheme-could-set-an-ugly-
national-precedent/.  
8. See Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 474 (2005).   
9. Id. at 484.  
10. Id. at 483; Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London: 
An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 491, 
544 (2006) (“[T]here is always a risk that the claimed public benefit relied upon to justify 
the taking is ‘merely incidental’ to the true benefits accruing to the benefited private 
transferee; in other words, ‘that the underlying program is . . . a ruse.’”).  
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 In response to Richmond’s proposed course of action, state 
legislatures should amend eminent domain laws to prohibit the 
use of eminent domain to buy underwater mortgages. Instead of 
using the power of eminent domain to solve the foreclosure 
problem, states should approach lenders with moral-hazard-
reducing principal reduction plans for homeowners who are on 
the edge of default and demonstrate inability to pay. These plans 
would include features that will reduce the risk that homeowners 
nearing foreclosure will cease making mortgage payments once 
they believe that the government will buy and refinance their 
loan. This plan would provide a fix for those on the verge of 
default. 
I. Background 
A. The Mortgage Crisis 
The early 2000s saw a boom in the housing markets and rapid 
growth in subprime mortgage lending. In fact, the yearly 
percentage of subprime mortgages of all mortgages issued 
increased from nearly eight percent in 2003 to twenty percent in 
2006.11 Many see the boom in subprime mortgage lending as the 
central cause of the housing crisis.12 Subprime loans, because they 
are loans made to individuals with poor credit history, 
demonstrate a higher risk of default than prime loans made to 
borrowers with better credit.13 Thus, these loans are given higher 
interest rates to hedge against the increased risk of default. Many 
agree that a pattern of deregulation and predatory lending 
practices led to unhealthy growth of the subprime mortgage 
market.14 With increased access to mortgages came increased 
demand for housing and home prices were artificially inflated. 
                                                   
11. Raymond H. Brescia, Capital in Chaos: the Subprime Mortgage Crisis and the 
Social Capital Response, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271, 282 (2008).   
12. See, e.g., Richard E. Gottlieb & Vivian I. Kim, Eminent Domain: Will Local 
Governments Attempt to Use This Extraordinary Power to Purchase Troubled Residential 
Mortgages?, BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP., 1, 2 (Nov. 2012).   
13. Subprime loans are classified in contrast to Prime loans, where borrowers match 
credit history requirements set out by the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE) like 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Adam B. Ashcraft, Til Schuermann, FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., 
STAFF REP. No. 318, UNDERSTANDING THE SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT 2 
(2008).   
14. See, e.g., Brescia, supra note 11, at 288.  
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  In late 2007, the housing bubble burst.15 Home prices 
plummeted and foreclosure rates skyrocketed as owners either 
failed to make the high payments that they had agreed to or chose 
to walk away from homes that were now worth far less than the 
money owed on the home’s mortgage. As a result, Richmond and 
similar cities suffer from a glut of empty, bank-owned homes. 
These vacant homes are a breeding ground for crime and 
negatively affect the value of neighboring properties.16 In order to 
keep homes with underwater mortgages from joining the stock of 
vacant properties, Richmond proposed to use eminent domain to 
buy and refinance underwater mortgages. 
B. Current State of Eminent Domain Law 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states 
that private property shall not “be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”17 Courts have struggled to determine what 
exactly constitutes a “public use.”18 The court rejected the idea that 
the public use means that the seized property must actually be 
used by the general public.19 Since the early 1900s, the Supreme 
Court has equated the concept of public use with the broader idea 
that property can be taken for a public purpose.20 In Berman v. 
Parker, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the District of 
Columbia Redevelopment Act.21 This plan, where Congress used 
eminent domain to acquire private, blighted property in order to 
                                                   
15. Jeff Holt, A Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the 
Resulting Credit Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120, 126 (2009) (“Home 
prices reached their peak in the 2nd quarter of 2006 . . . foreclosure start rates increased . . . 
by 75 percent in 2007 compared to 2006.”).  
16. Lydia DePillis, Wall Street has so far Crushed a Drastic Foreclosure Fix: One 
California Town Could Change That, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Sept. 10, 2013; 11:45 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/09/10/wall-street-has-so-far-
crushed-a-drastic-foreclosure-fix-one-california-town-could-change-that/.  
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment was incorporated as against the states 
in land without just compensation in Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 
241 (1897).  
18. Lynn E. Blais, Urban Revitalization in the Post-Kelo Era, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 657, 
661 (2006).  
19. Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Min. Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (“In discussing 
what constitutes a public use, it recognized the inadequacy of use by the general public as a 
universal test.”) 
20. See, Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S. 
30, 32 (1916) (equating “public use” and “public purpose” by stating, “If that purpose is not 
public, we should be at a loss to say what is. The inadequacy of use by the general public as 
a universal test is established.”). 
21. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 36 (1954).  
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redevelop or sell the land to private developers, was deemed to 
serve a public purpose.22 In Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, the 
Court held that the Hawaii Land Reform Act’s practice of 
breaking up large estates by using eminent domain to purchase 
and then sell land to individuals who had held leases to small 
portions of the large estates qualified as a public purpose.23  
Relying on Berman and Midkiff, the Supreme Court, in the 
controversial Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., affirmed the 
City of New London, Connecticut’s development plan that would 
pass real property from a private owner to a private developer.24 
The Court held that the city had “carefully formulated an 
economic development plan that it believes will provide 
appreciable benefits to the community, including—but by no 
means limited to—new jobs and increased tax revenue.”25 The 
broad public use definition applied in Kelo is consistent with prior 
applications by the Court.26 However, critics of the Kelo decision 
found it unsettling that private actors could disproportionately 
gain from the use of eminent domain, whereby land is only 
supposed to be taken for public use or purpose, and could possibly 
do so based on political influence.27  
Kelo, explicitly and implicitly, asked for a state legislative 
reaction. Justice Stevens wrote in the majority opinion that 
“nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further 
restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”28 Today, forty-
three states have enacted post-Kelo statutes to limit their use of 
eminent domain.29 Statutory reactions to Kelo have varied. For 
example, the Michigan legislature amended its constitution in 
2006 to expressly state that “‘[p]ublic use’ does not include the 
taking of private property for transfer to a private entity for the 
purpose of economic development or enhancement of tax 
                                                   
22. Id. at 32 (“Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has 
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”).  
23. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 233 (1984).  
24. Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 474 (2005).   
25. Id. at  483.  
26. Corinne Calfee, Kelo v. City of New London: The More Things Stay the Same, the 
More They Change, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 545, 567 (2006) 
27. Carol L. Zeiner, Eminent Domain Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: Private Benefit 
Masquerading as Classic Public Use, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 21 (2010).  
28. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.   
29. Enacted Legislation Since Kelo, CASTLE COALITION, http://www.castlecoalition.org/i 
ndex.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=510 (last visited Sept. 10, 2013).  
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revenues.”30 California experienced more moderate reforms with 
comparably broad blight exceptions for the use of eminent 
domain to seize properties in areas of poor economic health.31 This 
blight exception allows for seizure of properties in the name of 
economic development, if the property meets meet certain 
physical conditions, like “incompatible land uses that prevent the 
development of those parcels or other portions of the project area” 
and economic criteria, such as “[d]epreciated or stagnant property 
values,” and “[a]bnormally high business vacancies.”32 
III. Using Eminent Domain to Purchase Underwater 
Mortgages is Inconsistent with the Public Purpose Test 
Based on Kelo’s expansive definition of public purpose 
Richmond’s plan arguably may pass constitutional muster. 
Helping individuals avoid foreclosure may reduce community 
crime rates, limit the price deflationary impact that vacant homes 
have on a community, and help the community appear 
economically viable to potential investors. These goals are 
consistent with Kelo’s holding that “[p]romoting economic 
development is a traditional and long-accepted governmental 
function, and there is no principled way of distinguishing it from 
the other public purposes.”33 
However, this plan represents an extension of eminent domain 
that would disproportionately benefit a few homeowners and 
private investors in a way that is inconsistent with eminent 
domain’s purpose and with the public benefit test. In his majority 
opinion in Kelo, Justice Stevens wrote that deferential, rational 
basis review of states’ use of eminent domain “does not . . . alter 
the fact that transfers intended to confer benefits on particular, 
favored private entities, and with only incidental or pretextual 
public benefits, are forbidden by the Public Use Clause.”34 The use 
of eminent domain to target a few individual homeowners and a 
private investment company flirts with this idea of “favored 
private entities” because, through this plan, the city is targeting a 
                                                   
30. MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2.  
31. Ilya Somin, Is Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform Bad for the Poor?, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1931, 1934 (2007).  
32. Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2132 (2009) (discussing California Senate Bill 1206).  
33. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 470.  
34. Id. at 490.  
28 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Online          Vol. 47 
 
few underwater mortgages under the guidance of Mortgage 
Resolution Partners (MRP), a private investment group. The city 
and MRP are picking winners and losers, and there is evidence 
that this selectivity is not wholly based on targeting blighted 
areas, as the plan includes the condemnation of mortgages on 
homes worth over a million dollars.35 States and local 
governments should not be allowed to target a few lucky 
individuals who are selected to have their mortgage payments 
reduced. This plan will benefit few homeowners who are on the 
edge of default, but any general public purpose is merely 
secondary. 
MRP also seeks to benefit substantially from this plan. MRP 
will pay the upfront cost of buying the mortgages and will charge 
$4,500 to refinance each condemned mortgage.36 On top of this 
fee, the investment group will also profit from the refinanced 
loans. For example, it has been speculated that the purchase of a 
$300,000 mortgage on a home now worth $150,000 may yield 
around $25,000 in profit to be split by the city and MRP.37 Profit to 
this multi-state private enterprise does not serve an actual public 
purpose. Although Kelo affirmed that eminent domain could be 
used to pass property to private developers, there must be some 
underlying public purpose at the end.38 Here, the purported public 
purpose at the base of MRP’s plan is secondary to the 
disproportionate gains felt by a few homeowners. 
IV. This Use of Eminent Domain will Cause Negative Practical 
Repercussions 
It is very likely that this plan will bring negative repercussions 
for future investors who seek to borrow money from banks to 
mortgage properties located in cities that have used eminent 
domain in this way. Banks may be hesitant to give loans in areas 
where mortgages have been seized by eminent domain, or they 
might still give out loans but at higher interest rates in order to 
                                                   
35. Carolyn Said, Pricey Homes in Richmond's Eminent Domain Plan, S.F. CHRONICLE 
(Aug. 20, 2013; 4:56 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Pricey-homes-in-
Richmond-s-eminent-domain-plan-4745146.php. 
36. Id.  
37. Nick Timiraos & Jeannette Neumann, Richmond’s Seizure Plan Complicated by 
Size of Mortgages, WALL ST. J.  (Aug. 14, 2013, 7:04 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/20  
13/08/15/richmonds-seizure-plan-complicated-by-size-of-mortgages/.  
38. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478. 
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combat the risk of government seizure.39 One Security Industry 
and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) executive commented 
that “the use of eminent domain confronts lenders and investors 
with an unquantifiable new risk, which will reduce the amount of 
credit available to potential homeowners.”40 If enough 
governments seek to use eminent domain in this way “it is 
possible that lenders would react by changing the terms of 
housing credit nationwide, rather than focusing a reaction on 
individual communities.”41 
Finally, the Richmond plan induces moral hazard. If the City 
of Richmond acts in this capacity, then homeowners who are 
underwater on their mortgages may stop making payments in the 
hopes that the government will seize and refinance their 
mortgage. Other refinance options (discussed below) may be 
available to reduce the moral hazard that may create incentives 
for owners to avoid default. 
V. Recommended Reforms 
 
A. States Should Ban the Use of Eminent Domain for 
Purchasing Private Mortgages 
 
First, in order to regulate the use of eminent domain proposed 
by the City of Richmond, state legislatures should modify state 
eminent domain law to prohibit seizure mortgages. State 
legislation should indicate, using the following model language, 
that “in order to ensure that the public purpose behind eminent 
domain is served, eminent domain shall not be used for the 
purchase of individual homeowner mortgages.” Although states 
have passed post-Kelo eminent domain reform, they have not 
specifically addressed the potential use at issue in Richmond.42 It 
is evident that this use is inconsistent with the public purpose test 
and will be harmful to mortgage owners if applied.  
                                                   
39. Ngai Pindell, Nevada's Residential Real Estate Crisis: Local Governments and the 
Use of Eminent Domain to Condemn Mortgage Notes, 13 NEV. L.J. 888, 902 (2013).  
40. Gottlieb, supra note 12, at 6 (quoting Press Release, SIFMA, SIFMA Opposes Use 
of Eminent Domain; Will Cause Irreparable Damage to Recovering Housing Market (Sept. 
7, 2012), available at http://www.sifma.org/news/news.aspx?id=8589940215). 
41. Pindell, supra note 39, at 902.  
42. Id. at 898. 
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State legislatures are in the best position to install this ban on 
the use of eminent domain to purchase private mortgages. First, 
states are experienced in and familiar with the eminent domain 
issues facing a post-Kelo world. It would be sensible and relatively 
simple for them to incorporate the proposed limit into their 
existing post-Kelo regulatory framework. Second, regulating this 
issue on the state level will allow for states to ban this use of 
eminent domain that is inconsistent with the public purpose test, 
while maintaining legitimate uses of eminent domain for blight 
removal and other public purposes based on each state’s priorities.  
Finally, eminent domain falls within the state’s police power.43 
The state is in the best position to operate its police power, within 
the federal Constitutional limits. The Supreme Court recognizes 
this in their eminent domain jurisprudence by instituting a 
“longstanding policy of deference” to state and local legislatures 
to operate within the doctrines Constitutional limits.44 
B. States Should Approach Banks with Moral-Hazard Reducing 
Principal Reduction Plans 
Although this Comment does not address the broader policy 
reforms that are necessary to ensure that the mortgage crisis does 
not occur again, it is obvious that forward-looking reform of 
predatory lending practices, loan securitization markets, and 
individual borrowing requirements need to be implemented. 
Within the scope of this Comment’s proposed reform is the 
immediate effect that the Richmond plan seeks to effectuate: 
helping those who are already underwater on their mortgages. 
This is an important goal, as underwater mortgages default at a 
higher rate, suffer the greatest losses at liquidation, and 
negatively impact both local and large economies.45  
The Richmond plan is right in that principal reduction is the 
key to helping homeowners on the edge of default. It is evident 
that many of the homes with underwater mortgages will not 
regain their bubble-level prices.46 For mortgages on the edge of 
                                                   
43. Robert Hockett, It Takes A Village: Municipal Condemnation Proceedings and 
Public/Private Partnerships for Mortgage Loan Modification, Value Preservation, and Local 
Economic Recovery, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 121, 160 (2012).  
44. Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005).  
45. Hockett, supra note 43, at 135.   
46. Id. at 136.  
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default, held by those who can demonstrate an inability to pay, 
principal reduction would offer a mutually beneficial solution for 
banks and homeowners.47 Often banks will collect more from 
payments on reduced mortgages than they would collect if 
homeowners walked away from their underwater mortgage. 
Especially given low home prices, low demand, and glut of 
foreclosed houses in cities like Richmond, it is unlikely that banks 
will be able to quickly resell foreclosed homes.48 Homeowners 
stand to gain because they will be able to stay in their homes, with 
a more feasible mortgage payment. 
Approaching banks with moral-hazard reducing principal 
reduction agreements, as well as political pressure from state 
legislatures, could lead to principal reduction without distorting 
eminent domain. Such principal reduction agreements have been 
made in the past, but only on a small scale.49 Banks will be more 
likely to agree to principal reduction under moral-hazard 
reducing schemes because they are currently hesitant to decrease 
principals  for some individuals out of the fear that others will 
cease payments of their mortgage in the hopes of securing a 
principal reduction. A plan that would reduce this risk is one that 
allows for a gradual reduction of the principal, contingent on 
steady payments being made.50 This contingency reduction 
encourages homeowners to make payments and provides lenders 
with some insurance of the borrower’s intention to pay. Another 
plan includes a “shared equity plan,” such that the principal is 
decreased but the bank can stand to recover a portion of the value 
if the price of the property increases in the future.51 
                                                   
47. Yuki Noguchi, Fannie, Freddie Won't Write Down Mortgage Principal, NPR (Feb. 
29, 2013, 5:40 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/02/29/147635014/fannie-freddie-wont-write-
down-mortgage-principal.  
48. Id. (Discussing how banks “make the decision that refinance and principal 
reduction is more financially advantageous to them than foreclosure or short sale”).  
49. An agreement with the five largest banks and the government lead to a twenty 
billion dollar reduction in principals, but represented a mere, ‘“drop in the bucket’ 
compared with the approximately $700 billion in negative equity that Americans carry on 
their homes.” Scott Neuman, The Mortgage Deal: A Reality Check, NPR (Feb. 9, 2012, 4:19 
PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/02/09/146654318/the-mortgage-deal-a-reality-check).  
50. Nin-Hai Tseng, 3 Ways to Write Down Mortgages Without Moral Hazard, CNN 
MONEY (Mar. 28, 2012; 11:57 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2012/03/28/principal-
mortgage-reduction/.  
51. Id.   
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Politicians should approach both Government Sponsored 
Enterprises (GSE) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are 
privately owned banks that operate under a congressional charter 
for a public purpose (to provide liquidity, stability and 
affordability to targeted areas of the mortgage market) and other 
private banks.52  GSEs hold a number of mortgages that could be 
written down.53 Last year, GSE banks declared that they would not 
allow for principal reduction but would instead opt for alternative 
loan restructuring methods.54 However, approaching GSEs and 
other banks with moral-hazard reducing schemes might 
incentivize them to agree to reductions for those who can 
demonstrate inability to pay. Banks will be more likely to agree to 
schemes that protect against the risk of massive defaults in 
reliance on reduction, just as they are more likely to agree to 
plans like the contingent reduction arrangement or the shared 
equity plan that give banks a greater chance of making more 
money in the long-run. Also, forcing borrowers to prove inability 
to pay and keeping them on the hook for reasonable payments 
consistent with the value of the home reduces the risk that others 
borrowers will strategically stop payments in hopes of getting a 
smaller principal. Finally, lenders will be more inclined to give 
principal reductions if there is a lesser chance that homeowners 
will cease payment in reliance on a government initiated 
refinance plan. 
VI. Conclusion 
There is no doubt that relief is required for cities like 
Richmond. However, the use of eminent domain to purchase 
mortgages is not the proper method to solve the foreclosure crisis. 
Using eminent domain to buy individual homeowner mortgages 
benefits a few homeowners and investors disproportionally, 
making the public benefit secondary.  Also, a plan like 
Richmond’s may backfire and cause more harm than good by 
inadvertently facilitating more restrictions and high interest rates 
on loans given in areas that have employed loan-seizure plans. 
Local leaders in areas disproportionally affected by the housing 
crisis should channel the political power of their state or national 
                                                   
52. Government Sponsored Enterprises, FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AUTHORITY, 
http://www.fhfa.gov/Default.aspx?Page=33 (last visited Sept. 22, 2013).  
53. Hockett, supra note 43, at 144.  
54. Noguchi, supra note 47. 
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legislators to approach banks with moral-hazard-reducing, 
principal-reduction plans. Perhaps the Richmond plan will shed 
light on the dire state of foreclosure-heavy cities and help give 
municipalities the political pressure necessary to negotiate 
principal-reduction plans with banks. 
